This chapter describes the negotiations to form the Renault-Nissan alliance. Many observers doubted that the companies would reach agreement in 1999, let alone develop a partnership lauded throughout the auto industry in 2010. Taking Renault's perspective, this chapter identifies the parties' interests, strategic alternatives, and preparations for negotiation. Then the main players and negotiation process, outcome and aftermath are fleshed out. The lessons from this case study include the value of probing beyond parties' surface differences, expanding typical avenues for preparation, conceiving unusual forms of relationships, managing the influence of a counterpart's no-deal alternatives, and incorporating long-term effects into the evaluation of an agreement.
grown significantly after World War II but fell into a deep financial crisis in the early 1980s. After 6 years of -shock treatment‖ involving plant closings, layoffs and divestitures, and a repeat round of costreductions in 1997, the transformed company had in many ways turned the corner. At the same time, the French government, which reduced its majority equity share in 1996, still owned 44.2% of Renault, and the company remained heavily dependent on its home and nearby European markets.
Nissan Motor (-Nissan‖) was Japan's 2 nd largest automaker. The internationally-oriented firm had production sites in 22 countries and sales in over 180. Nissan spearheaded the Nissan Group which comprised hundreds of subsidiaries and employed 130,000 people. With this workforce, the Group achieved substantially more than Renault in consolidated net sales: ¥6,659 billion ($56 billion) in FY1998. A proud, 90-year-old organization, Nissan had a longstanding reputation for engineering excellence. But in 1998, the company was floundering competitively, burdened by debt, and losing money for the fifth time in 6 years.
Schweitzer's Strategic View
"... [Renault] saw an opportunity that comes up once every 50 years." 2 Renault's président directeur générale (effectively, the Chairman and CEO) was Louis Schweitzer. He had joined the company as Chief Financial Officer in 1986, after serving in the French ministries of finance and industry, and played a central role in Renault's historic restructuring.
Appointed CEO in 1992, he was 4 years into his term when he ordered the 1997 round of cost reductions. While the move was controversial, Schweitzer was later credited with restoring the company's reputation.
In 1998, Renault was in better shape than it had been for decades but its position in the world auto industry was still precarious. Then in May, two major automakers, Daimler and Chrysler, announced a -mega-merger.‖ That event shook Renault's top management into deeply questioning their company's future (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:173) .
Interests
Schweitzer and his team identified several key interests for the company:
▪ improved global competitiveness in quality, cost and delivery ▪ accelerated internationalization of the company ▪ critical mass within the global auto industry ▪ a worldwide reputation for product innovation ▪ protecting domestic market share ▪ continued momentum as a revived enterprise While Schweitzer's predecessors had targeted volume and profit, he wanted to shift the corporate focus to quality. He was also determined to shrink Renault's 36-month R&D cycle to the 24-month cycle common in Japan. Renault had no presence in the U.S. market, which represented 23% of the world total, and had either no reputation or a poor one in Asia and other non-European markets. Schweitzer felt the company could capitalize on its innovativeness in product design. Some interests were interconnected. For example, achieving critical mass would work both to improve competitiveness and fend off attacks from hostile acquirers.
The Renault CEO had presided over the unconsummated-some say -failed‖-merger negotiations with Volvo in 1989-93. As a matter of personal interest, he certainly had no desire to repeat that experience (Lauer, 1999a) .
Options
Renault had two main strategic options: -go it alone‖ or join another major automaker. Renault held sufficient cash reserves to fund its own entry into the U.S. and could continue to enter limited-scope agreements with small automakers to plug operational deficiencies. However, these measures would neither accelerate internationalization nor create sufficient scale in a short time horizon.
With respect to a major partnership, Renault did not have much to offer any of the world's Top
Five (GM, Ford, Toyota, VW and DaimlerChrysler) . Schweitzer and his team drew up a list of potential Korean and Japanese partners but soon decided that the Korean companies had little to offer Renault.
The team concentrated on Japanese firms.
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Considering Nissan
Nissan had been the top Japanese automaker in the U.S. and top Asian automaker in Europe for decades, yet it had lost both positions by 1998. It held only 5% of the U.S. market. Customers and analysts perceived Nissan vehicles as dull and expensive. Beyond the red ink on its bottom line, Nissan suffered from a debt burden represented by a 5 to 1 debt-equity ratio. The company had to cover approximately ¥4,600 billion ($33 billion) in current liabilities by March 1999. On top of these problems, its business environment at home presented various constraints and challenges for operations, including a virtually sacrosanct commitment to lifetime employment.
From various sources of information, Renault executives could glean several Nissan interests:
▪ debt relief ▪ protecting the Nissan identity and brand ▪ returning to profitability ▪ reestablishing a strong position in the critical U.S. market ▪ improving its competitiveness in Asia and Europe ▪ ensuring the company's long-term health ▪ preserving jobs ▪ developing an effective solution for debt-ridden Nissan Diesel
Nissan Diesel was a truck and bus manufacturer in which Nissan Motor held a 39.8% share.
The president of Nissan Motor, Yoshikazu Hanawa, had been appointed to his position (effectively CEO) in June 1996. Having spent 40 years at Nissan, he was a dedicated -company man‖ but also a strong-willed leader. He had a personal interest in seeing his company recover and pull out of its current condition.
Pre-Negotiation Moves
Making Contact
In June 1998, a month after the DaimlerChrysler announcement, Schweitzer wrote Hanawa a letter broadly proposing that they explore ways to enhance their companies' competitiveness.
Schweitzer sent a similar letter to Mitsubishi Motors. However, Hanawa replied promptly.
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Additional Preparation
Renault executives initially prepared to talk to Nissan about a limited collaboration such as a manufacturing tie-up in Mexico. Schweitzer's inner circle for the tightly guarded -Pacific Project‖ included Executive Vice-Presidents (EVP) Georges Douin and Carlos Ghosn. Douin, who oversaw product and strategic planning and international operations, conducted the early studies of potential Asian partners. Ghosn was a cost-cutting expert who masterminded Renault's post-1996 restructuring.
It did not take long for the group to look beyond a one-country relationship with Nissan.
Renault and Nissan had many common and complementary interests. They were -minnows living among sharks‖ trying to survive in the short term and thrive in the long term. Both CEOs were intent upon improving their companies' competitiveness, rebuilding the organizations, and enhancing the companies' reputations.
At an operational level, EVP Douin (2002:3) concluded that the two companies had an -almost miraculous complementary relationship.‖ Renault's emphasis on product innovation fit Nissan's need to depart from dull, undistinguished cars. Each company sought to strengthen its standing in the other's strongest market: Nissan wanted to recoup its position in Europe (and the U.S.) while Renault wanted to expand into Asia. The list went on.
There were no previous conflicts between the two companies or CEOs to impede a relationship.
Conversely, there was no strong foundation on which to build. Moreover, while there were many examples of U.S.-Japanese collaborations between automakers, there were no salient Franco-Japanese ventures. In Japan, according to Douin (2002:3) , the French had a -poor image … [as] not an industrial
[power] … arrogant, not very serious, and volatile.‖ As a result, the Renault team felt they would have to prove themselves.
Nissan's Options
To pursue Nissan's interests, Hanawa had few appealing courses of action in June 1998. 
Moving Forward
From the outset, Schweitzer eschewed the idea of pursuing a typical acquisition or merger with Nissan (Korine et al., 2002:22) . He believed key stakeholders and the Japanese public would oppose a foreign takeover. Instead, he envisioned an alliance-a -subtle balance‖-between the two companies (Douin, 2002:3) .
Issues
The meta-issue for the companies to negotiate was the basic nature of a relationship. Specific agenda items included the scope of their collaboration, their respective contributions, and an organizational structure.
Whatever the basic relationship, management control and equity valuations were bound to be sensitive issues. Given Nissan's history and prominence in Japan's industrial sector, Hanawa and his team would be protective of the company and determined to ensure that Nissan Motor had a future. At the same time, while Renault had $2 billion in cash to spend, the company's financial history and government supervision necessitated that Schweitzer proceed prudently.
The Negotiations
"It's a question of seducing rather than imposing."
4 -Striking the Deal (January-March 13, 1999)
5 -Finalizing Details (March 14-27, 1999)
The following sections describe the various actors and each phase of the negotiation process.
Participants and Stakeholders
As is typical of high-stakes corporate negotiations, the number of direct participants in the Renault-Nissan talks started small-less than 10 on each side-and grew as the discussions intensified.
The two CEOs formally initiated the talks and remained engaged throughout the process. EVP Douin, Both executive teams were advised by investment bankers: Merrill Lynch for Renault, Salomon
Smith Barney for Nissan. Internal specialists supported the negotiation teams. Three months into the negotiations, the teams drew 120 resource personnel from their companies and organized joint teams to study specific areas of company operations in detail.
The number of actors and arenas in such an undertaking is difficult to grasp and track without what some negotiation analysts have called a -party map‖ (Watkins, 2002:11) . Figure 1 depicts direct participants, staff, stakeholders, and other relevant parties evident in January 1999, a little over halfway through the negotiations. While not every germane actor appears in the figure (e.g., European Union
Competition Bureau), it illustrates the complexity of the negotiation and provides a guide for the playby-play account in the next section.
- DaimlerChrysler co-CEO Jurgen Schrempp and to Ford CEO Jacques Nassar, but let us return to the Renault-Nissan story before we take up these encounters.
Phase One
In June 1998, after the Schweitzer-Hanawa exchange of letters, a select group of Renault and Nissan representatives met secretly to explore their respective interests in strategic collaboration. By the middle of the month, they were preparing for their CEOs to meet. Six weeks later, Schweitzer and
Hanawa met for the first time in Tokyo. 4 They established rapport quickly (Korine et al., 2002:42-43) and put the wheels in motion for studies on potential benefits of collaboration. (For a detailed chronology, see the appendix.)
Phase Two
During the 7 weeks from August 1-September 10, working groups in and from both companies conducted preliminary analyses on purchasing, engines and gearboxes, car platforms, production, distribution, and international markets. Results were promising. Nissan's capabilities in large cars, research and advanced technology, factory productivity, and quality control complemented Renault's talent in medium-sized cars, cost management, and global strategies for purchasing and product innovation (Douin, 2002:3; Renault, S.A., n.d.) .
Highlighting the trust he felt they had established, Schweitzer proposed to Hanawa that they strengthen their relationship by holding each other's shares. Hanawa replied that Nissan had no money to spend on buying Renault stock. Schweitzer said they could talk about the subject again in the future though he also underscored how critical their collaboration was to Renault's future (Morosini, 2005:5) .
On September 10, the two CEOs met in Paris and signed a memorandum of understanding committing their companies to evaluate synergies more extensively in an exclusive arrangement for the next 3½ months.
Phase Three
From September to December 1998, 21 intercompany teams assembled from specialists on each side thoroughly examined the companies' respective operations. The teams held meetings at nearly every one of the companies' sites worldwide, visited plants, and exchanged cost and other proprietary information. As one reporter (Lauer, 1999a) later observed, information exchange of this kind was remarkable in an industry where companies jealously guard their manufacturing secrets.
Top management facilitated collaboration within the study teams as needed (Lauer, 1999a) , and a coordinating committee reviewed progress monthly. (Communication between study teams was prohibited; teams reported directly to the chief negotiators.) The executives' main concern during this period was development of a business strategy; specific financial issues were left for the final rounds.
Schweitzer and Hanawa-and the negotiation teams-continued their meetings at venues ranging from their headquarters to cities in Thailand, Singapore, and Mexico. (Ultimately, the CEOs met 12 times.)
Within Renault, Schweitzer and his executives concentrated on refining their concept of an alliance. They drew on their experience with Volvo (Korine et al., 2002:46) and examined the FordMazda partnership as a model, paying particular attention to financial and cultural dimensions (Barre, 1999a; Lauer, 1999a) . Ghosn and 50 Renault researchers began taking daily Japanese classes (Diem, 1999) . Schweitzer subsequently said the team was guided by the French maxim, -To build a good relationship, you do things together and look in the same direction together‖ (Eisenstein, 1999) . In the same vein, one alliance scholar (Morosini, 2005:5) described the first 6 months of the Renault-Nissan discussions as -a corporate experiment in living together before marriage.‖ By October, the negotiations centered on a Renault investment in Nissan. Schweitzer had sounded out French government officials about the alliance and obtained support from Prime Minister
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Lionel Jospin, among others. For his part, Hanawa set four pre-conditions for a deal: retaining the Nissan name, protecting jobs, support for the organizational restructuring already underway at Nissan with Nissan management leading the effort, and selection of a CEO from Nissan's ranks.
In mid-November, Nissan's board of directors took the extraordinary step of inviting Schweitzer, Douin and Ghosn to Tokyo to present their vision of the alliance. The presentation was so well-received that the Renault team deemed it a turning point in the negotiations (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:178.) Later in the month, Hanawa paid a courtesy call to DaimlerChrysler co-CEO Schrempp in Stuttgart. Schrempp proposed to go beyond his interest in Nissan Diesel and make an investment in Nissan Motor itself. 5 Hanawa then flew to Paris to inform Schweitzer personally of his intention to follow up on Schrempp's offer. This was not Hanawa's first contact with alternative partners. He had also sounded out Ford CEO Nassar (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:176) , who showed no interest.
In December, as the Renault and Nissan negotiating teams discussed the legal form of a relationship, they hit an impasse. Renault had suggested a subsidiary or joint venture. Nissan rejected both concepts. 6 EVP Ghosn, who did not regularly participate in the negotiations, proposed an informal alternative that both sides accepted (see -The Deal‖ below). 
Phase Four
The fourth phase of the negotiations began with Renault's first public, albeit guarded, acknowledgement of its talks with -potential partners … including Nissan,‖ but the period was punctuated by developments in the competing Nissan-DaimlerChrysler negotiations (Lauer, 1999a ).
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DaimlerChrysler was not simply a foil for Hanawa to leverage in the Renault negotiations; it had real pull of its own with Nissan management. They admired Daimler (Mercedes) and knew DaimlerChrysler had deep pockets. In contrast, they saw Renault as -no better off than Nissan in terms of future viability and survival‖ (-Gallic Charm,‖ 1999; -Shuttle Diplomacy,‖ 1999 (Barre, 1999b) . Hanawa probed Ford's CEO yet again about a linkage, but without success. Schweitzer realized Hanawa's choice was now -Renault or nothing‖ (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:176-9) .
What happened then has been described differently by different sources. Ghosn and researchers who interviewed principals at both companies (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:179-180; Korine et al., 2002:45) contend that Schweitzer restated the terms of his standing offer. The rationale for not reducing it, even with DaimlerChrysler gone, was consistency of intent. Schweitzer was trying to develop a cooperative relationship, and he did not want Hanawa to feel Renault would later exploit Nissan.
A news article written 2 days after the deal was done (-Shuttle Diplomacy,‖ 1999) reports that Schweitzer sent Hanawa the following confidential message, -There is hope that Renault will be able to make a larger investment than we proposed earlier.‖ Schweitzer did not specify the amount and asked
Hanawa to trust him, but he also insisted that Hanawa agree, by March 13, on freezing contact with other potential partners. Schweitzer needed that commitment in order to go to his board.
Hanawa flew to Paris on March 13 and after a 5-hour meeting with Schweitzer and his team at Roissy Airport, signed a preliminary agreement for Renault to acquire a stake in Nissan. The agreement was announced publicly.
Phase Five
On March 16, at the beginning of the 2-week final phase of the negotiations, Schweitzer obtained the internal approvals he needed from the Renault Board of Directors and Work Council (Renault Communication, 1999) . These decisions centered on a 35% stake in Nissan for $4.3 billion (Lauer, 1999a cf. Korine et al., 2002 . This amount exceeded the 33.4% threshold for an investor to gain veto power on a board in Japan and remained below the 40% level at which French accounting standards would require Renault to consolidate Nissan's debt. With the approvals in place, Renault issued a press release about its intention to purchase 35% of Nissan. At this time, Schweitzer offered to start exclusive negotiations with Nissan without delay.
The negotiations intensified. Nissan executives withheld their approval of an alliance for several days (Lauer, 1999b) . When an agreement was finally reached, Renault's investment had risen to $5.4 billion for 36.8% of Nissan Motor and stakes in other Nissan entities.
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The Deal
The -global partnership agreement‖ signed by Schweitzer and Hanawa on March 27, 1999
committed Renault and Nissan to cooperate to achieve certain types of synergies while maintaining their respective brand identities. The strategic direction of the partnership would be set by a Global Alliance engineering, purchasing, product planning) and to coordinate marketing and sales efforts in major geographic markets.
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The Aftermath
Before Schweitzer signed the Alliance agreement, he had made sure that Ghosn was willing to assume Nissan's top operating position (Ghosn & Riès, 2003:180) , and when the deal was done, Ghosn did just that. In June 1999, the Global Alliance Committee met for the first time (and monthly thereafter), and cross-company teams were set up with a leader from one company and deputy leader from the other. English was adopted as the working language in the Alliance. The Renault-Nissan relationship has evolved since 1999. Beyond adding partners to the alliance
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and sharing a CEO, the two companies have increased their cross-shareholding (see the appendix) and expanded their organizational linkages (Ghosn, 2002) . In 2009, these included 2 joint companies and 7 steering committees that manage over 30 cross-company teams, functional task teams, and task teams.
Lessons
Automakers' have negotiated international collaborations for decades and will continue to do so well into the future, but the Renault-Nissan negotiation stands out in many ways. Many observers did not expect it to lead to an agreement, let alone to a relationship that would become a model for industrial partnerships. So there are important lessons for negotiators and negotiation analysts to draw from Renault's experience.
Some of these insights relate to and reinforce recommendations from other case studies. For example, Sebenius (1998) concluded that parties should be clear about the industrial and strategic logic of a proposed partnership and the value it will create; price should not -bulldoze‖ other considerations.
Further, leadership and top-level support appear to be critical for progress in complex negotiations (see Weiss, 1987; 1997) .
Beyond these examples, however, the Renault-Nissan negotiation offers six distinctive lessons.
(1) Go beyond ostensible differences; probe parties' interests and capabilities for "fit." Unlike news reporters who emphasized cultural, linguistic and organizational differences, Schweitzer and his team focused on Renault and Nissan's common long-term goals, complementary interests and respective capabilities. Their fit on multiple dimensions motivated, directed and sustained the negotiators. Some differences matter less than others and not all differences imply incompatibility; in fact, they may offer substantial benefit.
(2) Prepare extensively, continuously, and jointly as well as internally. Renault took a broad view of preparation for negotiation. The company's executives and staff carried out thorough internal analyses but also spent months working with Nissan personnel even before a letter of intent was signed.
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The joint preparation before formal negotiations was more comprehensive and intensive in this case than in many others.
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The negotiations were far from the quick, superficial courtship-the -shotgun marriage‖-that some commentators (Woodruff, 1999) Nissan by putting ideas in print (e.g., the mock press release), announced commitments in public statements at strategic times, and most directly, asked Hanawa sign freeze agreements. Schrempp ultimately eliminated the Chrysler alternative, but Renault executives probably did as much as they could under the circumstances.
(6) Assess the quality of an outcome (agreement) by its effects as well as its content.
Negotiations tend to be evaluated in terms of their immediate outcomes. While the Alliance agreement attracted a great deal of media attention (see Tagliabue, 2000) , its main effects on Nissan and Renault can only be fully appreciated several years later. Back in 1999, few, if any, analysts anticipated Nissan's amazing recovery. At the same time, Renault -won the prize,‖ but its subsequent performance is a more complicated and mixed story.
In conclusion, Renault's experience with Nissan offers many insights about negotiation. Even in this short chapter, one can see various incentives and obstacles to reaching a satisfactory agreement and the admirable efforts of Renault executives before, during, and after negotiation. They constitute a highly instructive example of negotiations to establish interfirm collaborations in the auto industry and in international business generally. 
